The Moral Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe by unknow

Author:unknow
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Anscombe, moral philosophy, values, reasons for action, virtue, ethics, conscience, double-effect, murder, sexual ethics, spirit, good, architectonic good, truth, action theory, obligation, law, killing, just war, human embryo, life, lying, sincerity, moral education, belief
ISBN: 4461440
Publisher: Andrews UK Ltd.
Published: 2016-03-16T22:00:00+00:00

2 CPP3, pp. 30–55 (the paper was originally published in 1978). As she remarks in the Introduction to that volume: ‘I would have said I got interested in political philosophy in the 1970s simply out of an interest in the concept of murder’ (p. vii).

3 HLAE, pp. 261–277 (the paper was originally published in 1982).

4 See unpublished lecture, ‘Killing and Murder: Introductory’ (AIA 511, p. 2): ‘Nowadays if this question is asked [‘Is that sign, the strict commandment {i.e. the prohibition of murder}, a false sign?’], someone will say that the word “murder” simply means impermissible killing. If that should be true, “Thou shalt do no murder” only means “Thou shalt not kill human beings in cases where thou shalt not”. Then the commandment, however venerable, will be no sort of contribution to an argument that something is damnable because it is murder. For it will always first have to be determined that the killing of someone is wrong before it can be determined whether it is murder, and so it cannot effectively be argued that it should not be done because it is murder. It will also cease to be a substantial question whether it can be justifiable to murder.’ See further AIA 298, pp. 4–5: ‘There is an inclination to imagine a strong case for justifying a particular killing, from the point of view only of the urgently felt desirability of the consequences in the particular situation. If we let the existence of an at least discussable case for killing someone on such grounds imply that perhaps the act is not to be called “murder”, then we are surreptitiously undermining a certain pattern of reasoning about conduct. The pattern goes like this, where some here-and-now proceeding or plan is in question:

1. To do that would be to do such and such.

2. Such an action is, or of this kind is, or in these circumstances is: dishonest/ cruel/cowardly/an act of treachery/adultery/theft/murder/etc.

3. Therefore to do that in this case would be to commit an act of dishonesty or cruelty or ... etc. ...

This is a powerful piece of practical reasoning. I mean a will not to be dishonest, cruel, cowardly, a thief, adulterous, treacherous or murderous may very well exist, and where there is such a will, the possessor of it will tend to be moved by this reasoning. It undoubtedly can have a strong effect on the mind to be forced to contemplate one’s proposed actions under descriptions of this sort, the applicability of which may be arguable or evident from the undeniable circumstances of the case.’

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